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A	peacebuilding	perspective	on	post-conflict
reconstruction	in	Syria
by	Achim	Wennmann
Achim	Wennman	is	a	Senior	Researcher	at	the	Centre	on	Conflict,	Development	and	Peacebuilding	(CCDP)	of	the
Graduate	Institute	of	International	and	Development	Studies	in	Geneva,	and	Executive	Coordinator	of	the	Geneva
Peacebuilding	Platform.	This	article	was	originally	a	delivered	at	the	Conflict	Research	Programme’s	‘Political
Economy	and	Governance	in	Syria’	conference	in	December	2018.
In	the	absence	of	reconstruction	programmes	for	their	destroyed	city,	the	civilians	in	Raqqa
begin	repairing	their	houses	and	removing	debris	from	the	streets.	Credit:	Aboud	Hamam.
As	the	head	of	a	peacebuilding	network,	I	often	wonder	about	the	challenges	of	peacebuilding	in	Syria	and	how
these	will	affect	peacebuilding	elsewhere	in	the	Middle	East	and	the	world.	To	reflect	on	these	questions,	I	relate	to
my	own	work	on	the	political	economy	of	conflict	and	the	future	of	peacebuilding	practices.
If	we	look	at	the	literature	on	peacebuilding	over	the	last	two	decades,	we	can	point	to	a	strand	of	work	that
highlights	the	dysfunction	of	peacebuilding	as	an	international	project	that	aims	to	produce	order,	prosperity	and
participation	all	at	once.	The	more	recent	writings	on	the	‘post-liberal’	era	may	even	suggest	that	peacebuilding	has
become	an	orphan.	At	least	one	analysis	predicts	a	decline	in	donor	assistance	to	peacebuilding	in	Germany,
Sweden,	the	UK,	and	the	EU.	Such	analysis	is	also	cognizant	of	the	changing	political	environment	that	prioritises
stabilisation	over	transformative	approaches.	Research	carried	out	by	scholars	at	Kings	College	London	illustrates
this	shift	from	peacebuilding	practices	associated	to	civil	wars	to	political	settlement	negotiations	in	the	era	of
stabilisation.
This	changing	policy	environment	may	enable	post-conflict	efforts	in	support	for	stability	and	prosperity,	but	less	so
for	peacebuilding	approaches	that	aim	to	transform	underlying	conflict	dynamics.	Within	the	context	of	Syria’s
political	economy,	these	trends	might	also	marginalise	initiatives	focusing	on	participatory	politics.	At	best
‘participation’	may	become	part	of	a	narrative	around	sequencing	that	relegates	the	place	for	inclusive	politics	to	a
later	stage.	If	interests	for	Syria’s	post-conflict	reconstruction	converge	around	the	formula	‘order	and	prosperity	first
–	participation	later’	it	may	well	be	that	this	approach	will	frame	post-conflict	policy	in	other	parts	of	the	world	for	at
least	a	decade.
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What	does	this	changing	policy	environment	mean	for	peacebuilders	who	have	dedicated	much	of	their	work	to
strengthening	inclusive	politics?	An	answer	may	be	to	continue	such	work	without	explicitly	calling	it	‘peacebuilding’,
much	like	the	myriad	of	community-based	initiatives	in	many	places	that	build	peace	on	a	daily	basis	without	calling
it	by	that	name.	Peacebuilders	may	also	need	to	reflect	on	their	ways	of	working.	Rather	than	proposing	technical
programming	and	advice	to	build	peace,	they	may	shift	to	campaigning	and	movement	building.	There	are	lessons
learnt	from	the	fight	against	dictatorships	in	Latin	America	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	that	are	relevant	again	today.
From	this	perspective,	peacebuilders	might	find	utility	in	focusing	their	work	around	the	vulnerabilities	of
authoritarian	regimes,	including	for	instance	their	lack	of	legitimacy,	their	disrespect	of	basic	norms,	and	the	fear	of
their	own	people.
With	regards	to	the	argument	on	legitimacy,	let’s	consider	the	experience	of	Rwanda.	This	country	illustrates	how	a
Government	that	lost	substantial	local	and	international	legitimacy,	following	the	1994	genocide,	put	all	its	eggs	in
one	basket,	so	to	speak.	The	Government	prioritised	restructuring	the	economy,	along	a	Western	liberal	model,	so
as	to	attract	more	investment	and	create	more	jobs.	Business	reforms	were	carried	out	while	political	participation
was	halted	with	hopes	that	economic	growth	would	help	build	a	degree	of	‘performance	legitimacy’	and	strengthen
the	position	of	the	President	and	governing	party.	Rwanda	may	be	the	example	that	some	observers	point	to	when
looking	for	evidence	of	the	formula	‘order	and	prosperity	first	–	participation	later’.
Adopting	this	trajectory	to	Syria	may	offer	novel	perspectives	on	Syria’s	peacebuilding	challenges.	First,	the
Government	and	‘warlords’	may	realise	that	the	preservation	of	power	will	become	more	difficult	once	the	war	is
over.	In	part	this	is	due	to	the	sheer	necessity	to	deliver	vital	services	(such	as	education,	jobs,	transportation,	etc.)
but	also	due	to	the	operational	challenge	to	deliver	them,	including	the	needed	institutional	capacity,	human
resources,	and	budgetary	resources.	If	the	war	is	over,	the	population	will	judge	the	Government	or	‘warlords’
based	on	their	ability	to	deliver	and	perform	which	in	consequence	builds	legitimacy.	Yet,	it	also	means	that	the	war
can	no	longer	be	used	as	an	excuse	for	things	not	working	or	not	happening.
How	good	the	Rwanda	scenario	may	sound,	it	is	a	scenario	difficult	to	imagine	in	Syria’s	current	state	of	affairs.	The
Government	or	‘warlords’	have	little	incentive	to	develop	and	commit	to	a	formal	political	resolution	to	the	war.
Hence,	the	second	peacebuilding	challenge,	which	can	also	be	described	as	a	‘no	war	no	peace’	scenario	for	Syria
in	the	coming	years.	This	scenario	offers	enough	flexibility	to	advance	lots	of	‘reconciliation’	realities	that	have	their
own	local	logics,	interests	and	particularities.	It	may	also	open	tactical	spaces	for	the	Government	to	regain	control
of	territory	and	control	access	to	economic	spaces	or	over	economic	flows	(especially	remittances	and	investment).
Especially	the	latter	will	become	more	important	as	the	Government	needs	to	expand	budgets	to	pay	for
reconstruction	and	service	delivery,	while	remaining	relatively	isolated	internationally.
This	leads	me	to	a	third	peacebuilding	challenge:	How	will	Syria’s	Government	shape	the	balance	that	guarantees
them	stability	and	control	over	key	economic	sectors	while	at	the	same	time	creating	opportunities	to	satisfy	and	co-
opt	an	increasing	amount	of	people	that	are	currently	outside	of	its	support	systems.	From	this	perspective,
expanding	the	layer	of	popular	legitimacy	(by	for	instance	delivering	essential	services	and	expanding	economic
opportunities)	is	an	extension	of	the	Government’s	core	interest	in	‘regime	security’	because	it	can	mitigate
discontent.	Yet,	shaping	this	balance	in	favour	of	the	Government	will	be	difficult	in	the	face	of	Syria’s	‘closed-
access’	or	‘monopolised’	economy	with	limited	prospect	for	expansion.	From	this	perspective,	two	sources	of
tension	need	management;	on	the	one	hand	the	interests	within	the	authorities’	own	ranks	in	the	persistence	of
monopoly-	and	rent-based	systems,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	interests	of	actors	outside	its	system	in	essential
services,	economic	opportunities,	and	perhaps	also,	political	participation.
The	processes	behind	the	evolution	of	a	new	balance	–	and	the	management	of	the	moments	of	‘re-balancing’	–
could	shape	a	new	vision	for	‘normal’	politics	to	take	its	course	again.	Such	politics	have	checks	and	balances,	get
things	done,	and	creates	spaces	for	people	to	move	on.	After	nearly	eight	years	of	war,	there	is	undoubtedly	a
peace	to	build	in	Syria	but	there	are	many	open	questions	about	the	‘what’,	‘how’,	‘who’,	and	‘when’	of
peacebuilding	in	Syria.
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London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	or	the	UK	Government.
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